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Abstract
We analyze an Open Innovation process in a Cournot duopoly
using a dierential game approach where knowledge spillovers are en-
dogenously determined via the R&D process. The game produces
multiple steady states, allowing for an asymmetric solution where a
rm may trade o the R&D investment against information absorp-
tion from the rival.
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1 Introduction
According to Chesbrough (2003), the economic system is entering a new
era of Open Innovation (OI), where OI is dened as "the use of purposive
inows and outows of knowledge to accelerate internal innovation, and ex-
pand the markets for external use of innovation, respectively". This fact is
a logical consequence of a fast growing and highly competitive market for
new technologies. At this rate of growth, the companies' internal resources
are not sucient to meet the new challenges, and they have to access exter-
nal sources. What drives rms towards OI is the fact that many companies
are obliged to innovate and develop new products under extremely tough
time and resource constraints in order to stay in the market and keep being
competitive.
Open Innovation is vital for companies whose products have short life
cycles (for example software and consumer electronics) and extremely de-
manding criteria regarding quality, price and customers' expectations. The
complexity and diversity of the knowledge structure, like nanotechnologies
and biotechnologies, is another important factor. As long as "not all smart
people work for you" (Chesbrough 2003), there is an increasingly dispersed
distribution of useful knowledge in companies of all sizes. The amount of
available information is heterogeneously spread and companies cannot ac-
cess and monitor all necessary networks. Those networks are built on several
factors, including governmental and private organizations, academic research,
synthetic knowledge, know-how and highly specialized knowledge based on
experience and interaction among the agents. Hence, OI provides an access
to these networks. Thus, in a fast developing and expanding environment,
relying on the Closed Innovation approach is both insucient and risky.
The OI policy allows the company to use external technologies and share
its own knowledge with outside partners at a strictly managed and controlled
level. The company boundaries become "permeable" (Mortara et al., 2009).
The process of learning, accumulation of outside knowledge and competence
enables the company to be not only more innovative, but also innovate at
a higher speed. It creates linkages among companies that stimulate the
share of ideas, technology and experience. These strategies, as presented by
Monica Beltrametti, Vice President of the Xerox Research Centre Europe
(XRCE) at Grenoble Innovation Fair (GIF) on October 2010, help share
the risk, and reduce costs by using more suppliers. This also opens the
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way to new markets and explorations (ideas from new external participants,
such as governmental organizations, universities, other large companies and
individual representatives).
Furthermore, Open Innovation is an innovation in itself (Mortara et al.,
2009). It stimulates innovation by distributing the cost and risk, oering
access to new contact networks through "intermediaries" (Mortara, 2010)
and information pools, and also internalizes the unintended byproducts of
innovation process, spillovers (Bogers, 2011).
The Closed Innovation model based on the traditional patent system
discards unintended or irrelevant research results; however, it has long been
considered as a necessary cost for enhancing technical progress. Conversely,
the OI policy allows the company to sell those products that do not meet the
rm's capacity and development possibilities (in form of IP licenses) to other
companies. If observed from this new angle, the rm turns out to have two
functions: one is learning from the environment and the other is constructing
it by sharing its own knowledge via a systematic spillover ow. Hence, no
proof exists that OI generates less spillovers. The company must spend in
order to innovate, it must create and achieve itself the new technologies or
nd them on the market in the opposite case. Thus, there should be a balance
between the level of internal R&D and external knowledge resources accrued
by the rms. Otherwise, due to spillover's negative eect, that reduces the
gains, the rms have a lower investment level than socially desired (as in
Arrow, 1962, inter alia). In other cases rms may not take into account the
positive level their spillovers have on other rms' R&D and vice versa, leading
again to suboptimal level of R&D (Romer, 1990). On the other hand, rms
may be trapped into patent racing and overinvest, thus signicantly aecting
their prots levels. Moreover, they can disclose too much internal information
by adopting a purely Open Innovation approach (Enkel et al., 2009).
An important issue about OI is the complementarity between the internal
and external knowledge used for innovation in a given company (Vanhaver-
beke et al., 2007). In order to maximize the prots and achieve better results,
the company should be able to eciently scan the environment so as to iden-
tify relevant value added (i.e. technology and knowledge). Hence, it should
correctly assess the degree of complementarity between its R&D program
and externally available technology in order to take advantage from the OI
policy. This aspect of a rm's overall strategy can be thought of as a dy-
namic capability which is built over time (Helfat et al., 2007). Moreover,
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it is worth stressing that OI can be achieved through dierent routes. One
possibility is that the rm implements the policy as a "conscious" movement
due to its internal necessities (Mortara et al., 2009). Another possibility is
that rms are pushed towards OI by some external factors, like globalization,
knowledge-intensive environment, markets, or customer preferences.
What happens if the rms are able to optimally determine the spillover
delivered to others in the industry, and - in turn - rationally grab the spillovers
created by other rms? The eect is an increase in their gains, and a decrease
in unnecessary competitiveness. According to Jae (1986), who analyzed
the relevance of external R&D to individual companies, spillovers have a
positive impact on productiveness of own R&D, and a negative eect on
competitiveness.
We are going to investigate this issue in a duopoly model describing OI by
means of a dierential game approach, intending to highlight its equilibrium
structure and provide insights for the eects of dynamic OI diusion over time
in the industry under examination. The model we adopt builds upon Cellini
and Lambertini (2005, 2009), and extends it by admitting the possibility that
knowledge spillovers be endogenously determined during the R&D process.
We prove the existence of multiple steady state, including an asymmetric
one where, interestingly, the rm investing less in R&D enjoys higher prots
than the rival, thanks to the combining eects of savings upon investment
costs and exploiting information transmission.
The structure of the paper includes Section 2, where the setup of our
model is outlined, Section 3, containing the analytical study of the optimal
strategies, and separately featuring the symmetric and the asymmetric case.
Section 4 includes our conclusions and supplies hints for future developments.
2 The Setup
We consider an innite horizon dierential game modeling a duopoly with
single-product rms in continuous time t 2 [0;1). For simplicity, assume
rms supply homogeneous goods. Dene the inverse market demand function
as
p(t) = A  q1(t)  q2(t); (1)
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where A > 0 is the constant reservation price and qi(t) is the quantity pro-
duced by the i-th rm at time t.
Production takes place at constant returns to scale, with marginal cost
ci (t) evolving other time according to the following dynamic equation:
dci
dt
 _ci(t) =  ki(t)  i(t)kj(t) + ci(t); i; j = 1; 2; i 6= j (2)
where ki(t) is the R&D eort exerted by rm i at time t, and i(t) 2 (0; 1) is
the level of positive technological spillover or the level of OI enjoyed by rm
i (and transmitted by rm j).1 Parameter   0 is a constant depreciation
rate that results in decreasing returns due to aging of the technology.
Our approach to spillovers is precisely the feature of the model where
we depart from Cellini and Lambertini (2005, 2009). Here, we allow for the
spillover to be endogenously determined by the rms' instantaneous R&D
eorts, whereby Open Innovation made available to rm i changes over time
according to the following dynamic equation:
di
dt
 _i(t) = kj(t)  i(t) (3)
where  and  are positive parameters. The above equation refers to a
situation where rm i has access to an amount of OI (a state variable) that
deteriorates if rm j ceases to carry out any R&D.
The cost of creating R&D by rm i is described by the convex function:
 i(ki(t)) =
b[ki(t)]
2
2
, where b is a positive parameter. We are also assuming
that, in order for a rm to be able to absorb positive externalities from the en-
vironment, it has to bear some appropriation cost, which can be represented
as Ci(i(t)) =
[i(t)]
2
2
; where  is a positive parameter. For example, it can
be generated by the process of searching and assimilating new knowledge,
and subsequently adapting it to the rms necessities and standards.
Accordingly, the instantaneous prot function of the i-th rm will be
written as follows:
i(t) = (p(t)  ci(t))qi(t)   i(ki(t))  Ci(i(t)) =
= [A  qi(t)  qj(t)  ci(t)]qi(t)  b[ki(t)]
2
2
  [i(t)]
2
2
:
1In this model, productive technologies are perfect substitutes. For an alternative
approach where complementarity is considered, see Scotchmer (2010).
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We shall analyze a fully noncooperative game in which each rm sets
independently its own level of R&D (determining thus their productive e-
ciency and the respective degrees of information sharing), as well as the level
of output it wants to sell. Hence, the problem of rm i is to
max
qi;ki
i 
Z 1
0
i(t)e
 t dt (4)
subject to
_ci(t) =  ki(t)  i(t)kj(t) + ci(t) (5)
_cj(t) =  kj(t)  j(t)ki(t) + cj(t) (6)
_i(t) = kj(t)  i(t) (7)
_j(t) = ki(t)  j(t) (8)
The set of initial conditions is fci(0); i(0)g, for i =1, 2. Along the game rms
will discount the future prots, hence  > 0 is an intertemporal discount rate
common to both rms.
3 The game
The Hamiltonian of the i-th player is a function depending on the arguments:
t, q1; q2; k1; k2; c1; c2; 1; 2 and on all the related costate variables. In
turn, all arguments are depending on time, but from now on we will omit the
time arguments whenever possible to simplify notation. The current value
Hamiltonian function Hi takes the following form:
Hi() = e t

[A  qi(t)  qj(t)  ci(t)]qi(t)  b[ki(t)]
2
2
  [i(t)]
2
2
+
+ii(t)[ ki(t)  i(t)kj(t) + ci(t)] + ij(t)[ kj(t)  j(t)ki(t) + cj(t)]+
+ii[kj(t)  i(t)] + ij[ki(t)  j(t)]g (9)
where ii(t) and ij(t) are the current value co-state variables respectively
associated to the state variables ci(t) and cj(t), and ii(t) and ij(t) are the
current value co-state variables respectively associated to the state variables
i(t) and j(t).
We are going to determine the open-loop information structure of this
game by applying the Pontryagin's Maximum Principle. The procedure we
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are going to implement is standard in dierential game theory applied to
industrial economic models (analogous techniques can be found in Cellini
and Lambertini, 1998, 2002, 2009).
The rst-order conditions (FOCs) are
@Hi
@qi
= 0 =) A  2qi   qj   ci = 0 (10)
@Hi
@ki
= 0 =)  bki   ii   jij + ij = 0 (11)
Note that the linear-quadratic structure of the Hamiltonian function ensures
the concavity w.r.t. the control variables, and then the existence of a maxi-
mum point; indeed, the second order conditions read as:
@2Hi
@q2i
=  2 < 0 (12)
@2Hi
@k2i
=  b < 0 (13)
Before carrying out the standard procedure, we must point out that this game
has degenerate features, in that (10) do not contain any costate variable.
Hence, (10) represent a couple of policy functions which will be employed to
subsequently determine the equilibrium structure.
Dierentiating (10) w.r.t. time we obtain:
_ci(t) =  2 _qi(t)  _qj
_cj(t) =  2 _qj(t)  _qi
Plugging the expressions obtained from the latter relations and from (10)
into (5) and (6), we achieve the dynamic equations:
 2 _qi(t)  _qj =  ki(t)  i(t)kj(t) + ci(t) (14)
 2 _qj(t)  _qi =  kj(t)  j(t)ki(t) + cj(t) (15)
From (14) and (15) we deduce the following output dynamics:
_qi(t) =
1
3
[(2  j(t))ki(t) + ( 1 + 2i(t))kj(t) + (cj(t)  2ci(t))] (16)
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_qj(t) =
1
3
[( 1 + 2j(t))ki(t) + (2  i(t))kj(t) + ( 2cj(t) + ci(t))] (17)
By construction, (16) and (17) depend linearly on (5) and (6), so they are
not going to provide any further information about equilibrium.
The adjoint equations and transversality conditions for the costates ij
amount to: 8><>:
_ii(t) = (  )ii(t) + qi(t)
limt!+1 e tii(t)ci(t) = 0
; (18)
8><>:
_ij(t) = (  )ij(t)
limt!+1 e tij(t)cj(t) = 0
: (19)
For i 6= j, (19) admit the solutions ij  0. The adjoint equations and
transversality conditions for the costates ij are:(
_ii(t) = i(t) + ii(t)kj(t) + (+ )ii(t)
limt!+1 e tii(t)i(t) = 0
; (20)
8><>:
_ij(t) = ij(t)kj(t) + (+ )ij
limt!+1 e tij(t)j(t) = 0
: (21)
Plugging the solutions to (19) into (21) implies that ij(t)  0 are solutions
to (21), for i 6= j.
Before proceeding any further, some technical aspects are to be explained
in detail. The peculiarity of this game relies upon the fact that, since the
costate variables ii, for i = 1; 2, do not enter the FOCs, the are not actually
relevant for equilibrium. The standard procedure, i.e. the dierentiation
w.r.t. time of (10) and of (11) can only yield a system of control equations
originated from (18). The corresponding policy implication suggests that
the diusion of the spillover does not aect the optimal policy of the i-th
rm, so that the spillover eects are completely exogenous with respect to
the producer's strategy. In other words, although the benecial consequences
of OI on prot ows are obviously aecting both rms, the dynamics of its
evolution is irrelevant on the strategic decisions.
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Therefore, we will only take into account the transversality conditions for
ii. Since the involved optimal states and costates are:
ci (t) =

ci (0) 
Z t
0
(ki (s)  i (s)kj (s))e sds

e t;
ii(t) =

ii(0) +
Z t
0
qi (s)e
( )sds

e( )t;
then the transversality conditions hold if and only if:
lim
t!+1

ii(0) +
Z t
0
qi (s)e
( )sds

ci (0) 
Z t
0
(ki (s)  i (s)kj (s))e sds

= 0;
i.e.
ii(0) =  
Z 1
0
qi (s)e
( )sds;
then the optimal costates must be:
ii(t) =  
Z 1
t
qi (s)e
( )sds

e( )t:
The output control equations will follow from the dierentiation of (10),
entailing that they are linearly dependent on the dynamic constraints. Sub-
sequently, we achieve the simple identity:
_ii(t) =  b _ki(t); (22)
then, exploiting (11) and (22) in (18) we have:
_ki(t) = (  )ki(t)  qi(t)
b
(23)
_kj(t) = (  )kj(t)  qj(t)
b
(24)
leading to the following state-control dynamical system, consisting in eight
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ordinary dierential equations:8>>>>>>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>:
_ci(t) =  ki(t)  i(t)kj(t) + ci(t)
_cj(t) =  kj(t)  j(t)ki(t) + cj(t)
_i(t) = kj(t)  i(t)
_j(t) = ki(t)  j(t)
_ki(t) = (  )ki(t)  qi(t)b
_kj(t) = (  )kj(t)  qj(t)b
_qi(t) =
1
3
[(2  j(t))ki(t) + ( 1 + 2i(t))kj(t) + (cj(t)  2ci(t))]
_qj(t) =
1
3
[( 1 + 2j(t))ki(t) + (2  i(t))kj(t) + ( 2cj(t) + ci(t))]:
(25)
We are now going to search for the possible steady states of (25) by letting all
its equations vanish, but the aforementioned linear dependence of _qi(t) and
of _qj(t) leaves us with only six equations and eight unknowns. Consequently,
we will make use of (10), thus expressing all state variables depending on the
R&D eorts as follows:
ci = A  b(  )(kj + 2ki); (26)
cj = A  b(  )(ki + 2kj); (27)
i =


kj; (28)
j =


ki: (29)
By replacing the resulting expressions for ci, cj, i and j in the last two
equations of (25) and imposing stationarity, we obtain the following two
nonlinear equations in ki and kj:
 ki   

k2j +  [A  b(  )(kj + 2ki)] = 0 (30)
 kj   

k2i +  [A  b(  )(ki + 2kj)] = 0 (31)
Then, subtracting (31) from (30) and subsequently factoring the equation:
kj   ki   


k2j   k2i

+ b(  ) [kj   ki] = 0 ()
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() (kj   ki)

1  

(kj + ki) + b(  )

= 0;
we obtain two kinds of dierent zeros:
ki = kj and ki =
(1 + b(  ))

  kj: (32)
In the following subsections, we shall investigate both the symmetric and the
asymmetric equilibrium cases.
3.1 The symmetric equilibrium structure
The following Proposition illustrates the properties of the symmetric equi-
librium point:
Proposition 1. If
1.  > ;
2.  <

A
[2 + 3b(  )],
the game admits a symmetric steady state P = (c1; c

2; 

1 ; 

2 ; k

1; k

2; q

1; q

2);
where:
k1 = k

2 = k
 =
 [1 + 3b(  )] +p2(1 + 3b(  ))2 + 4A
2
;
c1 = c

2 = c
 = A  3b(  )k;
1 = 

2 = 
 =


k;
q1 = q

2 = q
 = b(  )k:
Proof. Consider the symmetric case, i.e. ki = kj = k and substitute in (30):
 k   

k2 + (A  b(  )(k + 2k)) = 0;
whose zeros are:
k1;2 =
 [1 + 3b(  )]p2(1 + 3b(  ))2 + 4A
2
:
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If  > , it can be easily observed that the smallest solution is negative,
whereas the remaining one is positive, and consequently feasible.
Since the level of spillover  is supposed to belong to the interval (0; 1),
we need to nd suitable assumptions so that this property be satised:
 =


k =
 [1 + 3b(  )] +p2(1 + 3b(  ))2 + 4A
2
< 1 ()
() ((3 + 3b(  )))2   (4A + (1 + 3b(  ))2) > 0 ()
() : : : ()  < 
A
[2 + 3b(  )];
hence if  <

A
[2 + 3b(  )], then  2 (0; 1).
Moreover, since the remaining coordinates of P , achieved by the relations
originated by the vanishing of (25), are positive for  > , then P  is a feasible
steady state for the system (25).
The expression of prot evaluated at P , expressed by means of k, is
 = (A  2q   c)q   b(k
)2
2
  (
)2
2
=
= (A  2b(  )k   A+ 3b(  )k)b(  )k   b(k
)2
2
  
2(k)2
22
=
= (k)2

b2(  )2   b
2
  
2
22

: (33)
The next Proposition will x the assumptions for the positivity of (33).
Proposition 2. If
1.  > ;
2. b >
1
2(  )2 ;
3.  < min
(

A
[2 + 3b(  )]; 
s
2


b2(  )2   b
2
)
;
then the prot function evaluated at P  is positive.
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Proof. A sucient condition for the positivity of (33) is given by:
b2(  )2   b
2
  
2
22
> 0;
which can be arranged by isolating  as in Proposition 1:
2 <
22


b2(  )2   b
2

:
Thus, combining this condition with the one stated in Proposition 1 ensuring
the existence and feasibility of P , we can conclude that if b >
1
2(  )2 and
 < min
(

A
[2 + 3b(  )]; 
s
2


b2(  )2   b
2
)
;
then  > 0.
The following gure, sketched with Mathematica 5.0, is the outcome of a
numerical simulation performed to illustrate the shape of (). It is worth
noting that () is concave w.r.t. , which can be explained on the the basis
of the balance between two opposite eects, i.e., the desirable gain generated
by the transmission of technological knowledge through an increase in the
spillover level, on the one hand, and the undesirable increase in the intensity
of competition that the same fact brings about via a decrease in marginal
costs and the resulting output expansion, on the other.
As far as the dynamic features of the trajectories are concerned, we can
evaluate the eigenvalues of a 4 4 Jacobian matrix, that is:
J (P ) =
0BBBBBBBBB@
@ _c
@c
@ _c
@
@ _c
@k
@ _c
@q
@ _
@c
@ _
@
@ _
@k
@ _
@q
@ _k
@c
@ _k
@
@ _k
@k
@ _k
@q
@ _q
@c
@ _q
@
@ _q
@k
@ _q
@q
1CCCCCCCCCA
=
0BBBBBBBB@
  k  1   0
0    0
0 0     1
b
  
3
k
3
1+
3
0
1CCCCCCCCA
;
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-0.0005
0.0005
0.001
PHΑL
Figure 1: We chose the following values for parameters:  = 0:01  = 0:77,
 = 0:05, A = 1  = 0:001, b = 2:5, verifying the conditions of Proposition 1.
() keeps positive as  2 (0:002; 0:01). In particular, for  = 0:006, P is
feasible:
P = (0:9359; 0:9359; 0:0674; 0:0674; 0:0112; 0:0112; 0:0213; 0:0213):
whose characteristic polynomial is given by:
pJ (P )() = 

(   )( + )(     ) + k

3b
+
( + 1)( + )
3b

;
thus admitting the null eigenvalue.
Proposition 3. J(P) admits at least one negative eigenvalue.
Proof. Since the known term of the characteristic polynomial of the Jacobian
evaluated at the symmetric steady state P is:
(  ) + k

3b
+
 + 1
3b
;
and taking into account that such polynomial vanishes at a negative value of
 if such quantity is positive, then  > , a necessary condition for feasibility
of P , is a sucient condition to admit a negative eigenvalue.
The latter result ensures that there exists a stable manifold associated to
the steady state, hence there exist trajectories heading towards that equilib-
rium point.
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3.2 The asymmetric equilibrium structure
Here we focus on the possible arising of asymmetric outcomes. We are going
to prove the following result:
Proposition 4. If the following parametric hypotheses hold:
1.  > ,
2. b <
1
(  ) ,
3.  2

[3 + 7b(  )][1 + b(  )]
4A
;
(1 + 3b(  ) + 2(b(  ))2)
A

,
the game also admits a non-symmetric steady state
Q = (cNS1 ; c
NS
2 ; 
NS
1 ; 
NS
2 ; k
NS
1 ; k
NS
2 ; q
NS
1 ; q
NS
2 );
where:
cNS1 = A  b(  )
"
3[1 + b(  )] p
(b; ; ; ; ; A)
2
#
;
cNS2 = A  b(  )
"
3[1 + b(  )] +p
(b; ; ; ; ; A)
2
#
;
NS1 =
[1 + b(  )] +p
(b; ; ; ; ;A)
2
;
NS2 =
[1 + b(  )] p
(b; ; ; ; ; A)
2
;
kNS1 =
[1 + b(  )] p
(b; ; ; ; ; A)
2
;
kNS2 =
[1 + b(  )] +p
(b; ; ; ; ;A)
2
;
qNS1 = b(  )
"
[1 + b(  )] p
(b; ; ; ; ; A)
2
#
:
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qNS2 = b(  )
"
[1 + b(  )] +p
(b; ; ; ; ; A)
2
#
;
and where

(b; ; ; ; ;A) := 2(1+b( ))2 4[(1+3b( )+2(b( ))2)2 A]:
Proof. Consider the non-symmetric case, consisting in the following relation
between the R&D optimal strategies:
ki =
(1 + b(  ))

  kj:
We substitute ki into (30) to obtain an equation having kj as an unknown:
  (1 + b(  ))

+ kj   

k2j
+ 

A  b(  )(kj + 2(1 + b(  ))

  2kj)

= 0;
which can be arranged as follows:
2k2j   (1 + b(  ))kj + [1 + 3b(  ) + 2(b(  ))2]2   A = 0:
The two roots of the latter equation are:
kNS1;2 =
[1 + b(  )]p
(b; ; ; ; ; A)
2
where

(b; ; ; ; ;A) := 2(1+b( ))2 4[(1+3b( )+2(b( ))2)2 A]:
To check whether the kNS1;2 are feasible we need to assess the positivity of the
function 
(b; ; ; ; ; A):

(b; ; ; ; ;A) > 0 ()
() 2(1 + b(  ))2 > 4[(1 + 3b(  ) + 2(b(  ))2)2   A]()
() : : : ()  7(b(  ))2   10b(  )  3 + 4A

> 0;
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implying that  should exceed the level denoted by b:
 > b  
4A
[(3 + 7b(  ))(1 + b(  ))]
As in the asymmetric case, the feasibility of the steady state requires that
0 < NS1;2 < 1. Since obviously 
NS
1 > 0 and 
NS
1 > 
NS
2 , we have to determine
sucient conditions such that the following system of inequalities holds:8><>:
NS1 < 1
NS2 > 0
()
8><>:
p

() < [1  b(  )]
p

() < [1 + b(  )]
;
hence the sucient conditions can be expressed by the following system:8>><>>:
b <
1
(  )p

() < [1 + b(  )]
:
Rearranging the latter inequality, we have that:
2(b(  ))2 + 3b(  ) + 1  A

> 0 ()
() : : : ()  <   (1 + 3b(  ) + 2(b(  ))
2)
A
:
If we compare the two levels, a direct computation yields that b <  irrespec-
tive of all the remaining parameters' values, therefore a sucient condition
for  is  2 (b; ): Combining this last constraint with the one for the feasi-
bility of qNS1 and q
NS
2 , i.e.  > , we obtain the three assumptions for all the
coordinates of Q except cNS1 and c
NS
2 , whose expressions follow from the rela-
tions (26) and (27). Since cNS1 > c
NS
2 , it suces to prove that c
NS
2 > 0 under
the same three assumptions. To begin with, we can rewrite it as follows:
cNS2 > 0 () 2A  3b(  )[1 + b(  )]  b(  )
p

() > 0:
Then, employing the above inequalityp

() < [1 + b(  )] ()  b(  )
p

() >  b(  )[1 + b(  )];
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the previous expression can be estimated:
2A  3b(  )[1 + b(  )]  b(  )
p

() >
> 2A  3b(  )[1 + b(  )]  b(  )[1 + b(  )] =
= 2A  4b(  )  2b2(  )2 > 0
if and only if the following condition on  holds:
 > e := b(  )[2 + b(  )]
A
:
Consequently, now it is sucient to prove that e < b in order that  2 (b; )
yields cNS2 > 0. By using some algebra, we obtain that
e < b () b(  )[2 + b(  )]
A
<
[3 + 7b(  )][1 + b(  )]
4A
()
() : : : () 3 + 3b22(  )2 + 2b(  ) > 0;
and this completes the proof of the feasibility of cNS1 and c
NS
2 and nally of
the asymmetric steady state Q.
The prots of rm i at asymmetric equilibrium are:
NSi =

A  qNSi   qNSj   cNSi

qNSi  
b(kNSi )
2
2
  (
NS
i )
2
2
: (34)
In order to check that NSi > 0 for both rms, when the asymmetric
equilibrium is feasible, we shall prove the following Proposition:
Proposition 5. If
1. Proposition 4 holds with the further hypothesis  >
3
2
;
2. b >
1
2(  )2 ;
3.  <
b(2b(  )2   1)2
2
 
(1 + b(  )) p
()
(1 + b(  )) +p
()
!2
;
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then both players'prots are positive at the steady state Q.
Proof. Plugging the coordinates of Q into the expressions (34) and imposing
positivity, we obtain two dierent inequalities which can be expressed by
isolating parameter , i.e.:
NS1 > 0 ()  <
b(2b(  )2   1)2
2
 
(1 + b(  )) p
()
(1 + b(  )) +p
()
!2
;
(35)
NS2 > 0 ()  <
b(2b(  )2   1)2
2
 
(1 + b(  )) +p
()
(1 + b(  )) p
()
!2
;
(36)
where 
(b; ; ; ; ; A) is dened as in Proposition 4.
Since  > 0, a necessary condition for (35) and (36) to hold is given
by: b >
1
2(  )2 ; which must be compliant with the assumption on b of
Proposition 4. That can occur if we replace the assumption  >  with
 >
3
2
.
Since the right hand side of (36) is larger than the right hand side of (35)
irrespective of all parameters' values, the most restrictive inequality is (35).
Hence, combining all the previous parametric assumptions, the positivity of
both prots is veried.
Also in this case, we may carry out some numerical simulations for illus-
trative purposes. Choosing the parameter values  = 0:05,  = 0:5,  = 1:2,
A = 1, b = 2:5,  = 0:0005,  = 0:011, we can list the equilibrium levels
of states, controls and prots in the next table and proceed to a comparison
between the players' performances:
cNS NS kNS qNS NS
1st rm 0.942068 0.979609 0.00348368 0.00391914 0.575781
2nd rm 0.895894 0.0766409 0.0445277 0.0500936 0.00355528
Figure 2 illustrates the behaviour of the two rms' prots as functions of
. A general appraisal of the comparative performance of rms is that rm
1 attains higher prots by virtue of the following mechanism: a lower R&D
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eort yields a higher production cost, which in turn brings about an output
restriction; hence, rm 1 essentially aims at reducing its own investment costs
while free-riding over the rival's R&D activity. Overall, the cost-saving eect
of shrinking the R&D investment more than oset the negative consequences
of operating at a higher marginal cost and selling a lower quantity (which
always amounts to bad news under Cournot competition, all else equal).
0.009 0.0095 0.0105 0.011Α
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
PHΑL
Figure 2: The upper graph represents 1() and the lower one represents
2() as  2 (0:009; 0:011). In this range of parameters, the dierence
between prots (and the prevalence of 1 is particularly evident.
As we stated in Section 3, the linear dependence of _q1(t) and of _q2(t) on
the remaining kinematic equations does not provide us with additional infor-
mation on dynamics. Therefore, we are going to neglect them and construct
the Jacobian matrix in the 6-equation case, evaluated at Q:
J (Q) =
0BBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBB@
@ _c1
@c1
@ _c1
@c2
@ _c1
@1
@ _c1
@2
@ _c1
@k1
@ _c1
@k2
@ _c2
@c1
@ _c2
@c2
@ _c2
@1
@ _c2
@2
@ _c2
@k1
@ _c2
@k2
@ _1
@c1
@ _1
@c2
@ _1
@1
@ _1
@2
@ _1
@k1
@ _1
@k2
@ _2
@c1
@ _2
@c2
@ _2
@1
@ _2
@2
@ _2
@k1
@ _2
@k2
@ _k1
@c1
@ _k1
@c2
@ _k1
@1
@ _k1
@2
@ _k1
@k1
@ _k1
@k2
@ _k2
@c1
@ _k2
@c2
@ _k2
@1
@ _k2
@2
@ _k2
@k1
@ _k2
@k2
1CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCA
=
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=0BBBBBBBBBBBBBBBB@
 0  kNS2 0  1  NS1
0  0  kNS1  NS2  1
0 0   0 0 
0 0 0    0
0 0 0 0 (  ) 0
0 0 0 0 0 (  )
1CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCA
J (Q) is an upper triangular matrix. Thus, its entries on the main di-
agonal coincide with its eigenvalues: ,  ,    , all of them being double
roots of the associated characteristic polynomial. The negative eigenvalue 
ensures that Q is a saddle point too, hence there exist optimal trajectories
heading towards Q.
4 Concluding remarks
We have described the dynamic properties of a Cournot duopoly treated as a
dierential game with cost-reducing R&D. The main goal was to investigate
the nature of Open Innovation and make an analogy to extant economical
and managerial issues. To do so, we have nested the endogeneity of knowl-
edge spillovers into the setup dating back to Cellini and Lambertini (2005,
2009). By doing so, we have achieved multiple equilibria, with both symmet-
ric and asymmetric steady states. In particular, the asymmetric solution is
quite interesting as it is generated by a setup which, a priori, is fully sym-
metric. Numerical simulations show that the rm with a higher private R&D
investment level has a considerably smaller level of OI absorption eort, and
vice versa. Moreover, prots increase as OI absorption increases, even in
presence of a lower level of production.
In view of the growing relevance of OI, research on this issue will plausibly
intensify in the near future. Possible developments include investigating (i)
the possibility of selling R&D spillovers in the market, taking into account
the issue of property rights; and (ii) the feedback equilibrium structure.
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